Our planet is immense and complex, consisting of millions of different species and varieties of human beings with similarities and differences. It is not only that people from one part of the earth to the other are different in the sense that they have different cultural backgrounds, which make them think, behave and act differently, but also that people of the same country and region are often so different from one another. Some imagine that the way they think, behave and act in their cultural context is universal or that their ways are better than others and that others have to submit to them. Such a way of thinking has brought conflicts between people of different cultures. One wonders if we can speak about common morality in such diversified cultures. It is for this reason that this article tries to see if there is a possibility of building a common morality in such multicultural and pluralistic societies. It will do so by giving both the arguments for and against the existence of common morality before drawing a conclusion.
Tom L. Beauchamp defines common morality as the set of norms shared by all persons committed to the objectives of those values, promoting human flourishing by counteracting conditions that cause the quality of people’s lives to worsen.[1] Hans Küng says that a global ethic does not mean a single global culture but the necessary minimum of common human values, criteria and basic attitudes affirmed by all religions and non-believers despite their dogmatic differences.[2] We need also to underscore the criteria for common morality such as its aspect of communality, similarity, stability, objectiveness and respect of human dignity.
Küng justifies the existence of common morality through the quest for universal values of truth and justice, arguing that when an unjust event is televised, most people identify themselves with local people, even compelling the politicians to act. Here one sees that people do share some basic values. Due to this, an international solidarity can come into being beyond all national, cultural and religious limits, showing that there is something like core morality, minimal morality, and a set of elementary ethical standards that people share in common.[3]
The obvious criterion for common morality is that of communality or similarity. A moral norm or value is seen as common if it is similar from one culture to another. Jeffrey Stout argues that if the similarity is great among societies, we say that there is a common morality. Two groups would share a common morality if their ways of thinking about a moral topic were similar.[4] Since moral similarity is found in many societies of different cultures, it is proof that there is a certain common morality.
Morality is common when it is objective and when it achieves its objectives. Most people may agree that common morality entails objectivity, but very few consider if it has also to respect its objectives. Beauchamp argues that some norms exist because they are proven to have successfully achieved the objectives of morality, central to which is human flourishing. What justifies the norms is that they are best suited to achieve the objectives of morality. A set of standards is justified if and only if it achieves the objective of common morality.[5] Since there is a certain objectiveness of morality, it is also possible to have a common morality.
Michael Amaladoss argues that, in principle, every society affirms the value of human life and assures the basic necessities of life to all people. Societies try to protect and defend the life of the vulnerable, such as children, women and the poor.[6] In this sense, though life is not absolute, people in different parts of the world generally take life as a value in itself and as an element of a common morality.
Küng sees common ethical instructions like the Golden Rule as a justification for the existence of common morality because they are found in many great religious and ethical traditions.[7] The Parliament of the World Religions in 1993, through the document ‘Declaration Toward a Global Ethic,’ points out that the values such as the ‘Golden Rule’ that are shared by the major world religions transcend religious, cultural and political borders, are universal, irrevocable and binding.[8] The Golden Rule is built on the morality of love, for every society demands love at least among its members, though Jesus Christ asks to love even one’s enemies.
For a morality to be common, it requires stability. But, is morality static, or does it change? Beauchamp argues that such change can only be possible when the objectives of morality change, in such a way that what was previously immoral is now moral and vice versa. In principle, all moral norms could change, but such change is extremely unlikely. He admits that particular moralities, customary practices and consensus moralities can and do change, but it is not so easy regarding common morality.[9] This stability in morality in different cultures is the testimony of the existence of shared common morality.
The existence of the common morality is also supported by feminists. Margaret A. Farley argues that not recognizing universal morality eliminates the possibility of women’s common cry for justice, condemnation of injustices and action for shared goals. The feminist case for common morality stands on the conviction that human persons ought to experience moral claims in relation to one another and that some of these claims ought to cross the boundaries of culture, history, gender, race and class. Such experiences presuppose some communality in human beings. Yet, the range of universal moral norms may be narrowed.[10]
Stout doubts the claim of the common morality because of the changing context. Since one context differs from the next, not everyone is justified in believing the same propositions. Moreover, even in the same society, morality can change if the living context changes, as morality evolves depending on the changing context. Thus, if being justified in believing something depends on context, and context can change, then we should do our best to remain open to that possibility.[11] Thus, it is difficult to claim an absolute common morality.
Though Küng is a proponent of common morality, he questions its existence due to regional ethics and pluralism.Some people think that a basic global consensus on ethical questions is impossible, since there are only regional ethics. Morality pertains to a particular regional environment that cannot transcend the culture, denying cross-cultural morality, for morality is enslaved to the culture and to a particular region. Moreover, since the society in which we are living is so culturally complex, diversified, and pluralistic, it is impossible to have something like global ethics, as it is difficult to find a consensus on morality.[12]
The feminist case against common morality is based on the gender issue. Feminists resist this theory not because there are no certain cross-cultural moral norms and consensuses in morality, but because it is produced by and in favour of a patriarchal society, hence it is exclusive and oppressive of women and men who do not belong to a dominant group. The formulators of such a theory have inaccurately universalised a particular perspective whereby the needs and moral claims of some groups have been left out, their role and their duties distorted and their full voice silenced. What is thought to be ‘common’ morality, when examined carefully, turns out to be uncommon.[13]
The idea of the common morality is too general and abstract since it is based on general principles. This makes people prefer particular moralities to that of a common morality, for they can easily translate particularized norms into their life without any major problem.
At his inaugural speech in 2008, President Obama spoke of ‘common humanity,’ something strange for a politician in the Western world that cherishes individualism. Obama shows that there is something in common to all human beings despite the differences in race, colour, gender and status of life. The phrase ‘common humanity’ is the foundation of the claim of common morality because of our common origin and dignity. The conviction of common morality is based on the fact that there is a common humanity. Those who deny the existence of common morality should also deny the existence of common humanity. The fact that we are human already suggests that we have something in common, which in certain ways implies that we may share some moral values.
However, I believe humanity shares its moral values mainly at the level of general moral norms. In other words, the content of common morality may vary from place to place. Thus, particular and common moralities are not necessarily at odds, but rather are interdependent and complementary. Though not always, particular moralities try to realise a sense of common morality. Relativism and particular moralities should not be used as the basis of the non-existence of common morality. Just as humanity does not exist except through the experiences of specific human beings, so too does common morality exist only when translated into particular morality. In sum, one may say that particular morality can be seen as a contextualized and culturally relevant reflection of common morality.
—
[1] Tom L. Beauchamp, “A Defense of the Common Morality,” The Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13, no. 3 (2003): 260.
[2] Hans Küng, A Global Ethics for Global Politics and Economics, (London: SCM Press Limited, 1997), 92-93.
[3] Küng, A Global Ethics for Global Politics and Economics, 94-95.
[4] Jeffrey Stout, “On Having a Morality in Common,” in Prospects in Common Morality, ed. Gene Outka and John P. Reeder, (Preston, New Jersey: Preston University Press, 1993), 215-17.
[5] Beauchamp, “A Defense of the Common Morality,” 261-66.
[6] Michael Amaladoss, “Conclusion: Towards Global Community,” in Globalization and Its Victims: As Seen by the Victims, ed. Michael Amaladoss (Delhi: ISPCK, 1999), 227-28.
[7] Küng, A Global Ethics for Global Politics and Economics, 98-99.
[8] Alan J. Kearns, “Citizenship and World Ethos,” in Community-Constitution-Ethos: Democratic Values and Citizenship in the Face of Globalization, ed. Eoin G. Cassidy (Dublin: The Otior Press of the Mater Dei Institute, 2008), 74.
[9] Beauchamp, “A Defense of the Common Morality,” 270-71.
[10] Margaret A. Farley, “Feminism and Universal Morality,” in Prospects in Common Morality, ed. Gene Outka and John P. Reeder (Preston, New Jersey: Preston University Press, 1993), 178-83.
[11] Stout, “On Having a Morality in Common,” 219-22.
[12] Küng, A Global Ethics for Global Politics and Economics, 93.
[13] Farley, “Feminism and Universal Morality,” 170-72.