Populist politics is on the rise everywhere, from Turkey and Hungary to the United States, to parts of Latin America. The return of Donald Trump as President of the United States has added impetus to it, even as it has apparently faltered in Brazil and the Philippines, with the fall of Jair Bolsonaro and Rodrigo Duterte. Even in the liberal democracies of Western Europe right-wing populist parties have gained ground in elections. While in the past populism has included left-wing movements, the drift today seems to be towards the right, raising even spectres of an authoritarianism leaning towards fascism.
In Africa too, in slightly different forms, populism has made considerable inroads. Historically this has included appeals to ethnic nationalism, anti-colonialism and often cults of leadership of both the left and the right.
The Catholic Church’s role in all this has been complex, often ambivalent – or simply confused. The problem is not that the Church lacks the moral theological resources to critique populism, but that it may not understand what populism is, and its effects on societies.
What, then, is populism? One useful definition is that of political scientist Cas Mudde:
“an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups—‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’—and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004, p. 543),
best understood as a “thin-centered ideology” that can attach itself to broader ideological traditions, whether of the Left or Right.
This definition is itself only partly what theorists see as populism. Mudde’s definition, focusing on ideology, is the first general understanding of it. The second sees it as a political strategy where a leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, and uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers. A third sees it as a political style characterized by crisis rhetoric, appeal to “the people,” and performance of bad manners or anti-elitism. The fourth approach, articulated by Ernesto Laclau (2005), see it as a discursive frame, a discursive construction of political identity that articulates disparate demands into a chain of equivalence, constructing “the people” as a collective subject.
It is all of these, more often than not articulating the following common elements:
- The “People” versus the “Elites”: Populist leaders construct a Manichean dichotomy (often expressed in language verging on – and sometimes lurching into – conspiracy theory) between an imagined community, a politically constructed nebulous majority, and some specifically targeted minority, mostly economic, political or intellectual elites, or at times minorities subject to discrimination and prejudice (e.g. LGBTI+, racial minorities, migrants, refugees, etc). The latter are blamed and become the scapegoats for real and/or perceived situations of adversity like poverty or unemployment or, at the extreme, a sense of cultural or existential threat to the “People”.
- These issues are then used by populist politicians (quite often themselves members of elites) to gain access to political, economic and social power in the interests mainly of themselves, frequently pursuing the subversion or replacement of existing organs of governance. More often than not, the populist rhetoric expresses contempt for governance, media and rule of law, frequently dismantling or trying to dismantle them.
- Another dimension one finds in such moves is an attempt to ‘reconstruct’ society in the name of the ‘People’ but in the interests almost always of populist leadership, the latter often manifesting as increasingly authoritarian demagogues, some of whose political trajectory shifts towards advocacy or use of violence. Unchecked this can lead to dictatorship, repression and persecution of those deemed unacceptable to the new order.
Africa has had her fair share of populist regimes. It has seen anti-colonial nationalist movements that drifted towards either authoritarian leaderships, often shifting from inclusive nationalism to tribalist politics. The drift noted above indicates that at least on one level populist politics can have a positive role – liberation from colonisation, and promotion of democracy to name but two. Unfortunately, it is often the case that such movements drift from positive, inclusive populism to something more sinister: authoritarianism and corruption (Cf. Southall, 2016). On some levels we have seen political parties in democracies playing tribal identities against each other in elections to serve the interests of the new elites (Branch & Cheeseman 2008; Mueller 2008). At most extreme, this ethnic nationalism and populist senses of grievance have led to massacres of minorities and civil war, e.g. the 1994 Rwanda Genocide. Populism in Africa is spurred on by social conditions of poverty, socioeconomic inequality, unemployment (particularly among youth), corruption and elite impunity, exacerbated by weaknesses in, and mistrust of, government institutions and even the rule of law (the latter often seen as subject to corruption and elite manipulation).
What, then, is the role of the Church and Catholic Moral Theology in addressing populism?
From a simple dimension of Catholic Social Thought, it would seem that we are in a good position to critique the worst of populism, while giving any potentially positive element like the promotion of democracy our qualified approval. Key themes (cf. Curran 2002; Dorr 2012; Hollenbach 2002;Massaro 2015) like dignity of the human person, the common good, Solidarity, Subsidiarity, preferential option for the poor, and participation and democracy all challenge populism’s twin tendencies towards authoritarianism and exclusion of the Other.
Populist leaders frequently target immigrants, ethnic minorities, religious dissenters, or the press. Right-wing populism in particular constructs national identity in exclusive terms, often based on race, religion, or culture. This violates both the universal dignity of people and the principle of inclusion. In Fratelli Tutti (2020), Pope Francis warned that it reduces society to a “people” who are artificially constructed and defined by opposition and exclusion (§159). For him human dignity required universal respect, not conditional belonging.
Solidarity, a “virtue not of vague compassion but of firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the good of all” (John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, §38), challenges populist tendencies towards tribalism, ‘Othering’ and exclusion. The Common Good which focuses on the sum total of social conditions which allow individuals and groups to reach fulfillment through access to education, healthcare, security, justice, and participation is not the same as populist majoritarianism, the “will of the majority” that often overrides institutions, minority rights, and procedural justice.
Similarly, while populist regimes often centralize power in the executive, undermine parliaments and courts, discredit civil society, and even dismiss academic, legal, or ecclesial expertise, Catholic Social Teaching insists that subsidiarity is essential for human flourishing, institutional health, and authentic democracy (Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, §79–80).
I could go on, but I think my point is made. There is, however, a problem.
Though the Church is frequently exemplary in articulating such principles of Catholic Social Teaching, we do not always escape from the populism trap. Individuals may be swayed by rhetoric that promises justice but that may do more harm than good in the long run, or be misused by populist leaders; as human beings, too, Catholics are subject to multiple loyalties and identities that may lead them in the wrong direction – the ambivalent role many of the Church’s members (including clergy and religious) played in the Rwanda Genocide (cf. Uwineza, Rutagambwa &Kamanzi, 2023) is a particularly disturbing case from Africa.
There is also the risk that the Church, particularly leadership, can be seduced by part of a populist agenda over issues that reflect institutional interests (like enjoying influence in sectors like health, education and welfare), by the promise of special privileges (like state funding), or by promises of supporting the Church’s moral agenda, e.g. prohibition of abortion and the curtailment of LGBTI+ rights. The problem with all these is that once such a ‘deal’ is made the Church becomes to varying degrees beholden to and even identified with a populist regime.
As Catholics and as theologians, it is our task in Africa and everywhere to deepen our understanding and analysis of populism with a view to educating and warning the Church as a whole about populism’s dangers. For history teaches us that when the Church has aligned itself with authoritarianism, when authoritarian regimes finally fall we fall with them. And getting up again is often difficult.
Bibliography
Branch, D., & Cheeseman, N. “Democratization, sequencing, and state failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya.” African Affairs, 108(430), 2008: 1–26.
Curran, C. E. Catholic Social Teaching 1891–Present: A Historical, Theological and Ethical Analysis. (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002)
Dorr, D. Option for the Poor and for the Earth: Catholic Social Teaching. (Maryknoll NY: Orbis Books, 2012).
Hollenbach, D. The Common Good and Christian Ethics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
Laclau, E. On Populist Reason. (London: Verso, 2005).
Massaro, T. Living Justice: Catholic Social Teaching in Action. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015).
Mudde, C. “The Populist Zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition, 39(4), 2004: 541–563.
Mueller, S. D. “The political economy of Kenya’s crisis.” Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2(2), 2008: 185–210.
Southall, R. Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa (Oxford: James Currey, 2016).
Uwineza, M, Rutagambwa, E., & M. S. Kamanzi (eds.), Reinventing Theology in Post-Genocide Rwanda:
Challenges and Hopes (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2023).